The return of the political Freud? Some notes on the new historiography of psychoanalysis by Bar-Haim, S
1  
 
  
 
The return of the political Freud? Some notes on the new historiography 
of psychoanalysis 
 
• E. Zaretsky, Political Freud: A History, New York: Columbia University Press 
 
• M. ffytche and D. Pick (eds), Psychoanalysis in the Age of Totalitarianism, London: Routledge 
 
• D. Herzog, Cold War Freud, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
In an illuminating essay on the work of the late historian John Forrester, Andreas Mayer 
suggested recently that in his early career, ‘Forrester set out to solve the problem that must 
occupy (if not torment) any Freud scholar, namely how to connect the then largely 
unknown ‘Freud 1’ (the neurophysiologist) with the very famous ‘Freud 2’ (the 
psychoanalyst)’ (Mayer, 2017, 155).  Mayer, himself a historian of science and a close 
colleague of Forrester, tells the story of how Forrester managed to bring psychoanalysis 
back into debates in the history and philosophy of science, after many decades, when 
historians fully accepted the consensus in the natural sciences that psychoanalysis was not 
a science. Forrester’s project was to find a way of making psychoanalysis a legitimate topic 
within the history of science on its own terms: namely, without giving up its essential 
intersubjectivity. Psychoanalysis, he wrote, ‘should be a legitimate object for history and 
philosophy of science – because of the seeming triviality of its objects, because of the fact 
that it arouses strong emotional responses in scholars and because of the fact that its 
repeated claims to be recognized as truly scientific have been largely contested’(ibid, 152). 
However, since the 1970s, at the same time as these debates on how to reconcile Freud 1, 
the scientist, with Freud 2, the therapist – cultural historians (Forrester included) took a 
different direction in their research, and attempted to portray a Freud 3 – a ‘political 
Freud’. The three books under consideration here all focus on the history of this ‘political 
Freud’, which is also the title of one of them. But who is this ‘political Freud’? 
 
Political Freud – an old-new historiography 
 
Freud was arguably the first historian of psychoanalysis, when as early as 1914 he 
published ‘The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’ (Freud, 1914). Historiography of 
psychoanalysis, however, has changed dramatically since then, with Freud's own 
autobiographical studies (1925), through Ernest Jones' seminal biography (Jones, 1953-57) 
and up until the post-1980s literature, which John Burnham (2006) dubbed the 'New Freud 
studies'.1 However, the works under review here are slightly different from the ones 
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 Burnham argues that many of the historiographical shifts of the 1980s onward are the outcome of two main 
factors: 1) a massive uncovering of some crucial archives; and 2) the taking-over of this field by professional 
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reviewed by Burnham more than a decade ago. While he refers mainly to scholarship that 
changed how we understand the early history of the psychoanalytic movement within its 
central-European context, many recent works focus on Freud's different readers 
throughout the 20th century, and their very different political agendas. 2 
 
The 1950s was the formative period, when Freud was portrayed  as a man of 
Enlightenment, the ‘godless Jew’ – the main historical narrative for many decades. This line 
of thought became even stronger in the 1970s and 1980s, with works that located Freud as 
an archetype of the secular ‘Jewish renaissance’ in fin de siècle Vienna (Rieff, 1959; 
Schorske, 1973; Gay, 1987; idem, 1988; see also, Ross, 2012). But this perception of Freud 
was challenged by historians who insisted on writing an ‘against-the-grain’ history of 
psychoanalysis, looking not only for what Freud said about himself but also for his ‘blind 
spots’. A new revival of interest in the 'Jewish Freud' since the late 1980s, for example, 
shifted the way we now see not only Freud himself, but also an entire generation of 
assimilated Jews in fin de siècle Central Europe (e.g., Gilman, 1993; Yerushalmi, 1991; 
Slavet, 2009). The 2000s saw another historiographical turn, with the emergence of the 
'(post) colonial Freud' (Khanna, 2003; Brickman, 2003; Said, 2004; Damousi and Plotkin, 
2012). This Freud became, for some scholars, a symbol for the racialization of all the 
human sciences in the 19th and 20th century, which helped to construct the non-European 
as the 'primitive' and the ultimate Other. However, the post-colonial turn also revealed the 
complexity of the Freudian legacy. As some of these scholars have shown, the Freudian 
project provided us with the hitherto missing theoretical tools to recognize Otherness, 
specifically racial Otherness. Put differently, the Freudian legacy emerged from a 
problematic colonial, and very often racial, intellectual history that shaped many of the 
modern social sciences. Yet it also, paradoxically, provided us with some invaluable 
epistemological tools in some late 20th   century struggles against racism, colonialism, and 
patriarchal values. In other words, Freud was always political, and reading him is always a 
reading of a 'political Freud' – the title of Eli Zaretsky's recent book.  
Zaretsky's book is one of several other new publications that attempts to provide 
different answers for the question of what the meaning of such a 'political Freud' might be. 
The aim of this essay is to review some of the major suggestions that these texts 
collectively offer. I would also like to propose a shift in historiography from the previous 
Freud – the post-colonial Freud. These two categories – the 'post-colonial Freud' and the 
'political Freud' – are of course not unrelated. However, the latter new historiographical 
paradigm is now more focused on psychoanalysis as a category of the Western 'self' rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
historians, that replaced, according to Burnham, other 'well-informed and talented writers who were using 
the history of psychoanalysis as a weapon in their struggles to control the medical, psychological, and 
philosophical understandings of Freud and the Freudians'[(214]). 
 
2
 Nevertheless, some major new contributions are still to be considered as part of the 'New Freud Studies' in 
Burnham's sense, let alone some new biographies of Freud (Roudinesco, 2016; Whitebook, 2017). For 
example, many years after the futile debates of the 1980s on whether Freud was a 'pseudo-scientist' 
('biologist of the mind') or not, Guenther (2015) and Mayer (2013) provided us with two different 
sophisticated and important studies about the neurological origins of psychoanalysis in the pre-
psychoanalytic period of Freud. 
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than on providing critical accounts of how psychoanalysis demonstrated Western 
projections of the non-Western Other.   
But first, why 'Political Freud'? And why not the 'political' Ferenczi, Jung, Lacan, 
Klein, Winnicott, Kohut – or indeed 'political psychoanalysis'? After all, a major 
achievement of the last three decades in the historiography of psychoanalysis has been the 
way in which this scholarship demonstrates how Freud was far from the only important 
figure in psychoanalytic history, and that the history of psychoanalysis is much bigger than 
psychoanalysis itself. That is, historians have repeatedly shown that the history of 
psychoanalysis is part and parcel of 20th century history, and that this is the right context 
in which to study the field – together with the Bolshevik revolution, the emergence of 
European fascism, the Cold War, the European Union, the fall of Berlin Wall, and the rise of 
neoliberalism. Moreover, scholars such as Zaretsky were eminent figures in a long struggle 
during the past few decades to open the gates of history more widely to psychoanalysis – as 
well as to make way for the study of key figures within the history of psychoanalysis 
beyond Freud himself. Why, then, is there a 'return to Freud'? And why now?  
First, it should be said that although some of the recent works certainly show a 
'return to Freud', they also use Freud as a signifier for psychoanalysis in the political and 
cultural realm, rather than taking Freud-the-man as the one and only father of the 
psychoanalytic movement. Furthermore, the new paradigm of a 'political Freud' emerged 
(and is still emerging) at the same time as other historians emphasized the eclectic 
character of psychoanalysis within the wider history of 20th century 'psy-disciplines' (Rose, 
1998). The primary questions for contemporary historians of psychoanalysis such as 
Shapira (2013), Robcis (2013), Forrester and Camron (2017) and El Shakry (2017) are: 
who is the Freud about whom we are talking in each case? What was his role in a specific 
network of a specific 'psy' community? What was the role of this 'psy' community in a 
wider historical context? Thus, if a 'return to Freud' takes place in the recent 
historiography of the 'psy' disciplines, it is a very different Freud from the one who has 
occupied the literature until very recently.  
 
Return to the political Freud 
Zaretsky's book is neither a political biography of Freud (which can be found in 
numerous other places, including in Zaretsky's seminal book, The Secrets of the Soul; see 
also Whitebook, 2017), nor is it necessarily a guide for Freud's political worldview. Rather, 
the book provides several genealogies of how Freudianism was used as an inspiration for 
‘progressive’ politics in some of its most important subjects – and turning points – in 20th 
century history, and especially in American history (e.g., black history, antisemitism, the 
feminist movement). As such, Zaretsky's aim is to explore the radical promise of political 
Freudianism – a promise that typically was not fulfilled. His case studies '[highlight] two 
seemingly antithetical moments: a critical moment when political thinkers and social 
movements looked to psychoanalysis to clarify the irrational sources of domination; and an 
affirmative moment when Freudianism became submerged in a larger history and 
appeared to become obsolete'(12). 
Thus, for example, the second chapter tells the story of how Freud was admired by a 
number of leading black thinkers and artists, from the interwar Harlem Renaissance, 
through the Popular Front and Marxo-Freudianism, and up until the highly influential post-
WWII 'Freud of the Black Atlantic' best represented by Frantz Fanon. For black intellectuals 
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and activists, Freud was always political, because the personal, cultural and historical 
trajectories of those figures who used Freudianism for their political struggle were 
incapable of suggesting otherwise. They did not have the privileges that white middle class 
psychoanalysts and scholars had—that is, the privilege of insisting on a non-political-
Freud. For white middle class consumers of psychoanalysis, a non-political Freud was 
crucial for the emergence of 'personal experience or introspection'(28), a major feature of 
the second industrial revolution: 
 
For middle class white America, psychoanalysis served as avatar, interpreter, and authority over 
private, intimate space. In African American society the line between public and private was 
more tenuous, breached by racial intimidation, economic victimization, and sexual misuse (40). 
Thus, 1920s Freudianism was not only a crucial discourse for the construction of 'African 
American memory' but was also an important discourse in the black media, where one 
could find articles such as 'The psychoanalysis of the Ku Klux Klan' and 'The Mirrors of 
Harlem: Psychoanalyzing New York's Colored First Citizens'(45). In 1939, the pioneering 
African American author Zora Neale Hurston published her novel, Moses, Man of the 
Mountain, which was inspired by Freud's Moses and Monotheism. Other African American 
authors used Freudian ideas to explore topics such as domesticity, sexuality, femininity and 
masculinity within their racist political reality. For an author such as Ralph Ellison there 
was no need to turn Marx into a Freudian, or Freud into a Marxist – they were two sides of 
the same coin. Late 20th century commentators convincingly portrayed Freud as a 
Eurocentric thinker, which he probably was.  But for someone like Fanon it was actually 
'the anticolonial Freud' who helped him to create his huge political legacy. It was this 
'anticolonial Freud' who provided him with a better language for describing the racial 
unconscious governing the colonial world And yet, Zaretsky points to the fact that it was 
only after many of the great prophets of the Black revolution such as Wright, Fanon, and W. 
E. B. Du Bois died in the early 1960s that 'the activist movements were born' (77). In other 
words, when the Civil Rights movement arrived, Freudianism was no longer part of its 
vanguard. For Zaretsky, a 'political Freud' is always a sort of Moses who can see the 
Promised Land but is never allowed to enter it.  
Freud's Moses stands also at the centre of chapter three. In his highly-acclaimed 
book, Freud's Moses, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi (1991) suggested a new and provocative 
interpretation of Freud's famous book about the biblical Moses. One of his main 
interventions was to reclaim the old anti-Semitic accusation – to which Freud was 
particularly sensitive – that psychoanalysis is a Jewish Science. Indeed, against Freud's 
explicit intention, he suggested that whether we like it or not, 'history made psychoanalysis 
a "Jewish science''' (98), and that should no longer be a cause for shame. While Yerushalmi 
and others emphasized the particularity of the Jewish history in early psychoanalysis, it 
was Edward Said (2003) who presented a different view of the Mosaic legacy of Freud by 
reading Moses and Monotheism as an Ur-text of post-colonial studies. In his reading of 
Freud's Moses, Zaretsky refuses to take sides between Yerushalmi and Said, namely 
between reading Moses and Monotheism as a Jewish book and the post-colonial reading of 
it. However, he reminds us of an almost forgotten truth: Moses and Monotheism, written 
between the 1934 and 1938 and published only in 1939 when Freud was already in 
London, is 'a work of Jewish testimony, written by a political refugee' (110). Zaretsky 
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suggests locating it alongside other 'works by exiles such as Erich Auerbach and Hannah 
Arendt and survivors Primo Levi and Paul Celan'(108). Reading Zaretsky's two chapters 
together, one might think of adding another political refugee to this list: Frantz Fanon. 
Indeed, for Zaretsky the history of psychoanalysis and the history of the 20th century 
refugee are part of the same chapter.  
There is something misleading in Zaretsky's full title, Political Freud: A History, 
which contains the promise of a much fuller historical account, geographically and 
chronologically. The book is mainly focused on case studies taken from Anglo-American 
history (e.g. Freudian thinking on race; WWI, WWII and the invasion of Iraq; New Left and 
the feminist movement in 1960s and 1970s– all very focus on the American scene), which 
makes one wonder about the absence of the Latin American 'political Freud', the Zionist 
'political Freud'3 – indeed, the absence of the European 'political Freud' in the post-
Freudian Period? 4  
Yet it is a timely book, as it designates a ‘return to Freud’ – not the Lacanian 'return 
to Freud' of the post-WWII era, but rather the return to a 'political Freud', at a time when 
such a Freud is much-needed. It is not by chance that a few months after the book was 
published, and a few months before Trump was elected, Zaretsky published an online 
article on ‘American Id: Freud on Trump’, in which he asked: ‘Is it possible to read Freud 
historically in a way that can illuminate the Trump phenomenon?’ (Zaretsky, 2016). 
In other words, Zaretsky provides us with some historical case-studies for what 
psychoanalysis as a political category might be, and then offers – sometimes 
controversially – ways to understand the history of psychoanalysis as the history of our 
present political reality. Political Freud suggests that a major aim of historians of 
psychoanalysis is to trace back Freud's readers, or even people who might have read him. 
These readers, or potential readers, should be contextualized if we wish to have a better 
understanding of their political motivations and the social dilemmas that made 
psychoanalysis so suggestive for them – indeed, what took place outside the psychoanalytic 
library to draw them into it. The emergence of neoliberalism, neuroscience, and identity 
politics in the late 20th century, Zaretsky argues in the Afterword, made psychoanalysis 
seem somehow 'obsolete'. But for many decades, it helped, for example, 'Black radicals 
think through the long-term effects of slavery and racism', or 'characterize World War II in 
a way that illuminated the special role played by anti-Semitism' (196).  It was Freud's 
readers –in 1920s Harlem, in 1970s feminist circles in London, and in post-9/11 America – 
who turned him into a political figure, namely a signifier for the possibility of a radical 
social change, even if ultimately this was more often than not an unfulfilled promise. We 
live in an age where these readers are becoming fewer and fewer, summarizes Zaretsky, 
and so this political Freud becomes increasingly less relevant.  
 
Psychoanalysis between the totalitarian ‘there’ and the liberal ‘here’  
                                                        
3
  Some of these histories can be found in other places. See, Demasio and Plotkin, 2012; Rolnik, 2012; Liebscher, 
2017; and Herzog (2016)  that will be discussed shortly.  
4
 In a discussion with John Forrester, published in ffytche and Pick (2016), Zaretsky replied to some of his 
critics, who claimed that he was focusing too much on the American perspective in his earlier book, Secrets of 
the Soul. While accepting part of their criticisms, he also accused them– and not unconvincingly – of using the 
same coin albeit the other way around: his focus on American history is to some extent a reverse mirror to 
other psychoanalytic scholars' Eurocentrism.     
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Psychoanalysis in the Age of Totalitarianism provides a different model of a 'political 
Freud', by studying a very specific historical period, namely between 1933 and 1963 (when 
J.F. Kennedy was murdered). This was the era of the paradigmatic 20th century totalitarian 
regimes, Nazism and Stalinism; but it was also the golden age of the psychoanalytic cause. 
Indeed, in the age of totalitarianism, psychoanalysis was all around, either as an idealized 
treatment model and way of thinking, or a target of persecution – and sometimes both. 
Totalitarian regimes persecuted psychoanalysis as a 'Jewish science' in Germany, and as a 
'bourgeoisie psychology' in large parts of the Soviet Bloc (although it never totally 
disappeared in communist states, as old historiography used to claim). In some cases, 
however, dark regimes used psychoanalytic movements and even psychoanalysts 
themselves as a façade of a plural society, or even as a source of information for intelligence 
agencies against suspected 'dissidents'.5 In these cases, it is the history of Latin American 
psychoanalysis after WWII that immediately comes to mind (even if the relevant case 
studies often occurred later than 1933-1963). As John Forrester, to whom this volume is 
dedicated, aptly put it in his discussion with Eli Zaretsky: 'the difficulty about South 
America is that it might be a very uncomfortable truth for psychoanalysts to recognize that 
it can survive under some circumstances if the liberal professions are protected (138)". 
Perhaps the most intriguing and widely unknown example of the appalling connections 
between psychoanalysis and the liberal state is the collaboration of senior psychoanalysts 
and the CIA (and other related North American intelligence agencies) for producing 
political propaganda, mind-control, brainwashing, and indeed all sorts of torture in the 
Cold War era – as Knuth Muller describes in his contribution to the book. This troubling 
genealogy –from American ego-psychology to Abu Ghraib – should disturb all those 
concerned with keeping clinical psychology in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, 
safe from becoming the tools of political crimes.  
As I mentioned earlier, since the 1990s post-colonial scholars have been making a 
major critique of the abusive political usage to which psychoanalysis can be put. Although 
colonialism is not a major theme in Psychoanalysis in the Age of Totalitarianism, the two 
essays that deal directly with the topic suggest fresh and original perspectives to recent 
historiography, precisely on this issue of universalism. Some of the chapters show how the 
history of psychoanalysis challenges the idea that universalism and emancipation of 
colonialism are always contradictory. Indeed, the universalistic dimension of Freudian 
psychoanalysis was very appealing in post-war thinking about de-colonization. In their 
chapter, Ross Truscott and Derek Hook problematize this picture by showing how for 
figures such as the South African psychoanalyst Wulf Sachs and the psychologist Chabani 
Manganyi, psychoanalysis as a universalist paradigm served as an intellectual resource for 
developing an effective resistance to the apartheid regime. In a segregated society such as 
South Africa, the idea of universalistic psychology, which can be applied to everyone, 
regardless of race, could be attractive to many. Thus, Truscott and Hook argue that 'in 
disputing the validity of different racial categories in relation to the function of the Oedipus 
complex and melancholia, Sachs went against the grain of accepted psychoanalytic wisdom 
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 On the history of psychoanalysis under authoritarian regimes in Latin America see, for example, Dagfal, 
2012; Russo, 2012; and the more personal foreword of Catalina Bronstein to Psychoanalysis in the Age of 
Totalitarianism. See also below the discussion on Derrida (1991), which is still one of the sharpest texts on 
the need to politicize Freud.  
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even while using psychoanalytic thinking to do so' (197). After several decades of post-
colonial studies, we are now more familiar with historical narratives of how psychoanalysis 
was so useful in colonizing people's minds, but Truscott and Hook uncover a different 
aspect of the story. Namely, how a political reading of Freud provided agency and voice to 
individuals to whom such voice was denied on a purely racial basis. We might find it hard 
today to imagine why universalism was so appealing for some black and non-black 
patients, therapists and scholars in a segregated society like South African in the apartheid 
days, but perhaps this can tell us more about our own society, as well as our own inability 
to imagine different times and places where identity politics played only a negative role in 
reconstructing people’s ‘selfhood’ (see also Bertoldi, 1998).  
Literature about psychoanalysis and colonialism is often identified with Franz 
Fanon, who was a major inspiration for contemporary post-colonial scholars.6  Erik 
Linstrum, however, opens his chapter on psychoanalysis in the age of decolonization, with 
a discussion of Fanon’s rival, Octave Mannoni –  a French psychoanalyst who spent two 
decades in Madagascar, and published the then widely read book Prospero and Caliban 
(1956). Mannoni was notorious for arguing that colonialism created 'a pathological 
relationship of mutual exploitation', or what he described as 'dependency complex' (182). 
Colonized people, he claimed, do not know any other model apart from being governed by 
colonialists according to a parental model, in which they play the role of children. Likewise, 
however, Mannoni predicted the huge difficulty experienced by European people in the 
post-colonial age in adjusting to a new world where formerly colonized peoples no longer 
had to be obedient to them. As Linstrum demonstrates, Mannoni's views reflected a much 
wider common opinion in Britain, where psychoanalysis helped commentators to 
articulate feelings of anger, mourning, and regret for their diminished power to rule. Some 
psychologists warned against a 'pathologization' of the post-colonized societies in Africa 
and India, as the latter suffer – and will suffer even more in the future, so was the claim – 
from problems such as 'inferiority complex', 'wounded self-esteem', and 'aggressive 
attitudes' (187). Many described people in formerly-colonized societies in terms of a non-
mature 'child's desire to be equal to his elders' (ibid), to use the words of Alix Strachey. For 
others, ex-officials, Mannoni helped to acknowledge their part in operating racial colonial 
regimes, and in some cases, even to express regret. In the age of de-colonization, 'the 
familiar model of the official as father figure was increasingly overlaid with another 
template: the official as psychoanalyst' (191).  Some scholars are now turning back to 
assess how colonial psychology influenced political discourses of the colonizers back home, 
in Europe, rather than in the colonies themselves. Whether or not Truscott, Hook, and 
Linstrum designate a wider new revisionist approach to post-colonial historiography is yet 
to be seen, but surely these two contributions bring a much-needed fresh and original 
perspective to some established debates.  
Alongside this history of abusing psychoanalysis for the purposes of governing 
totalitarian states or colonizing non-European societies, there is a different intellectual 
history in which psychoanalytic thought claims to have a distinctive understanding of the 
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 One may recognize another historiographical shift within Fanon studies, where scholars gives much more 
attention to the influence on, as well as the importance of, Fanon in the mid-20th century negritude movement 
(rather than the focus hitherto on Fanon in the philosophical context of French existentialism). See Gordon, 
2015.  
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totalitarian state of mind due to its ongoing encounter with the ways in which the 'political' 
meets the individual unconscious. In other words, for the psychoanalyst, there is something 
about the clinical realm itself (i.e., the imagined or real intervention of the analyst in her 
patient's life) that gives her some specific knowledge of the mind under totalitarian rule. 
The British psychoanalyst Nick Temple describes a case study in which one of his patients 
'experienced him as a "bullying, cruel, dictatorial figure who was forcing dogmatic views 
onto her"' (p. 17).  The fact that it was 'here', in the liberal West, that this patient 
experienced psychoanalytic treatment as totalitarian is particularly instructive, because it 
is mainly 'here' rather than 'there' (e.g., Nazi Germany, communist Russia, China), that 'the 
two-way traffic between ideas of psychoanalysis and totalitarianism' (12) played such a 
central role. Thus, this volume tells us a great deal about liberalism and liberal societies 
more than it explores new realities for societies under totalitarian regimes. As Joel Isaac 
puts it in his introductory chapter on the controversial history of totalitarianism , 'by 
describing the history of psychoanalysis in the age of totalitarianism  we are describing the 
connections between psychoanalysis and the emergence of a certain kind of qualitative or 
existential politics, rather than merely procedural or legalistic liberal politics' (24). 
Furthermore, Peter Mandler argues that at its worst, psychoanalytic vocabulary served 
liberal societies as 'universal yardstick of 'normal' mental health that produced a rich 
language of reassurance for 'healthy' allies and an even richer language of pathology with 
which to stigmatize 'sick' enemies' (102). Even when it was not used in forms that could be 
considered by us today as propaganda, psychoanalysis was used as an ideological tool 
against totalitarian enemies, and was therefore part of the 'age of totalitarianism' (a careful 
choice of words by the editors, Matt ffytche and Daniel Pick). This is particularly evident in 
the case of the postwar British School of Psychoanalysis – as Michal Shapira and Sally 
Alexander show in their illuminating chapters – which fully endorsed the new welfare state 
as a necessary framework for the making of democratic minds; at the same time, the 
implementation of psychoanalytic ways of thinking were perceived as a necessary pre-
condition for maintaining a long-lived social democratic society. 
Even for some of the most vocal critics of the liberal state, such as Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the anxiety about a totalitarian future and their own forced exile brought 
them, by the 1950s, to mourn the decline of the paternal role in traditional society, as Freud 
portrayed it.7 As ffytche shows, this was the same paternal role that they regarded in the 
1930s as the foundation of bourgeois society, which must be radically removed for any 
Marxist revolution to emerge. Here again, totalitarianism was a concept discussed 'here', in 
the West, to describe what happened or has been happening 'there', even when it was used 
by scholars who arrived from ‘there’. Thus, usage of the term ‘totalitarianism’ cannot in 
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 See also Stephen Frosh’s chapter on Studies in Prejudice (1950) written by the Frankfurt School scholars, 
Max Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman. Frosh shows how much of their effort to provide an explanation of 
antisemitism just after the Holocaust was imbued with colonial language about the fall of ‘civilised’ society to 
a form of ‘atavism’, rather than part and parcel of modernity itself, as Zygmunt Bauman suggested many 
decades later (Bauman, 1989). Frankfurt School thinkers also tend to explain antisemitism in Marxist terms 
as one form of racism in the modern age, namely that the figure of the ‘Jew’ was part the structure of 
capitalism, where he or she played the role of the ‘Other’. But if ‘otherness’ is only a role that could be played 
by different discriminated people ‘then why are the Jews so consistently chosen as the recipients of this 
particular form of racialized violence’? (37). 
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itself provide us any knowledge of the historical reality of so-called ‘totalitarian’ societies. 
In the words of Michael Rustin, 
 
‘Totalitarianism’ like other social phenomena is not merely a ‘fact in itself’, or indeed a memory 
of such facts of the past, but is itself also a ‘social construction.’ The idea of totalitarianism was 
plainly value-oriented, since totalitarianism as a category lies at one end of an ideological 
spectrum, at the other end of which lie liberalism and pluralism as opposed principles of social 
organization (222). 
In other words, the term ‘totalitarianism’ was ideologically loaded, intended to designate 
foes and friends in post-war America and Western Europe.  
It should be noted that Rustin is the only scholar in this volume to mention Friedrich 
and Brzezinski’s then famous and now neglected book, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy (1956), in which the two provided a typology of the six basic features of a 
totalitarian society. Their text was a seminal to a whole generation of Cold War political 
scientists, and for long time as important as Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, if not more 
influential. While Arendt became one of the great heroines of the global left in the last few 
decades for what were perceived to be her prophetical theses, and while her texts proved 
as relevant to a neoliberal and allegedly post-ideological society, Friedrich and Brzezinski’s 
work is a real testimony of the fact that totalitarianism cannot be treated as a neutral 
category.    
Ana Antic's study of the role of 'psy' disciplines in the ‘re-education’ of political 
prisoners in Cold War Yugoslavia, is the only chapter in the book to research the historical 
reality 'there', in the East, in places under so-called totalitarian regimes – in contrast to a 
totalitarianism as an analytical construct of Westerner thinkers. Antic's research is 
pioneering in showing the reliance of an arguably 'totalitarian state' on these very notions 
of the 'psy' sciences when conducting 're-education' of political dissidents (which was not – 
as she convincingly shows in this and other publications – simply a form of torture in the 
eyes of its practitioners). However, her insistence that it was the psychoanalytic discourse 
which set the tone, rather than eclectic methods taken from other, different psychological 
schools and tailored specifically to the Yugoslavian project, remains only partially 
substantiated.       
Totalitarian society, Hannah Arendt argued, is a society in a denial; that is, denial 
becomes a form of survival.8 The refugee escapes not only a brutal reality but also an 
injunction not to know his or her own reality in order to stay alive. If, for Freud, life was an 
ongoing negotiation between the reality and pleasure principles, then under such 
circumstances of denial of reality, does the 'reality principle' have any meaning at all?  Can 
any political resistance be achieved when the idea of 'truth' itself is so deeply under attack? 
Lyndsey Stonebridge provides some answers to these questions by reading Arendt – a 
lifelong opponent of psychoanalysis – together with Anna Freud.9  Both women were not 
only refugees themselves but had deep interest in the psychical reluctance of persecutors 
and persecuted human beings to come to terms with reality. Furthermore, for both 'we are 
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 On 'denial' in history see Hall and Pick (2017), which is an introduction to a special issue of History Workshop 
Journal on the subject. 
9
 See, however, Jacqueline Rose's chapter on some surprising psychoanalytical dimensions in Arendt's thought. 
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obligated to reality precisely because we are not the only person in the world' (53); that is, 
both were motivated in their quest for reality by an ethical crisis no less than by 
psychological interest. For Arendt, this feeling that one is the only person in the world is 
the gist of the totalitarian state. According to her, then, the outcome of the totalitarian 
world is a psychological state belonging to the individual. However, her recognition of a 
political reality with a unique psychological state of mind says something about her as an 
observer, and not only about her observed subjects. Bringing 'totalitarianism' into the 20th 
century political dictionary seems now to be a moral project no less – and perhaps even 
more – than an historical attempt to explain what really happened 'there'. In this case too, 
Arendt and Anna Freud illustrate the postwar liberal societies in which they lived and 
worked for many decades after WWII, perhaps more than they describe what a totalitarian 
state was as a historical reality for its citizens.   
If totalitarianism – like psychoanalysis – is so deeply rooted in psycho-social and 
psycho-political mental phenomena, one might ask how useful it is as an analytical tool for 
historians. Is it useful to better understand what really happened in Auschwitz, or the 
Soviet Gulag, or for that matter, Guantanamo Bay? Indeed, perhaps it would be a mistake to 
simplistically compare 20th-century concentration camps to post-9/11's crimes in the 'war 
on terror'. As Ruth Leys aptly claims in the final chapter of this important volume, there is 
good evidence to suggest that we not only live in a 'post-psychoanalytic' world, but also in a 
'post-totalitarian' one. Both right and left, she argues, keep portraying the 20th century 
concentration camp as the main threat to humanity (hence, Leys is one of the fiercest critics 
of Giorgio Agamben), while in fact, focusing on these earlier models of authoritarianism 
and fascism serves all too well to avoid any confrontation with neo-liberal crimes, which 
are different in their essence and yet keep producing new historical forms of authoritarian 
regimes. By treating totalitarianism as the most fundamental threat to modernity, 'both the 
left and the right can ignore the very real contemporary problem of economic poverty 
resulting from global capitalism' (245), she claims.  I agree with Leys that even if we should 
historicize the age of totalitarianism, and even if we are able to reflect on some similarities 
and continuities between that era and our own, we should always bear in mind that 
‘totalitarianism’ is not necessarily useful for understanding the neo-liberal crisis and its 
catastrophic outcomes – including the environmental crisis, the refugee crisis, and the 
ongoing strengthening of nationalistic right-wing movements all over the world.  10 
 
 
Political Freud: the return to Europe 
 
In Cold War Freud, Dagmar Herzog (also a contributor to Psychoanalysis in the Age of 
Totalitarianism) presents a detailed historical study of post-WWII psychoanalysis in 
Europe and the US, and its wider political context. The book provides us with several 
paradigmatic case studies in which 'the world kept coming back of its own accord, 
pressuring all the players in the unfolding controversies to engage in moral-political and 
not just clinical reasoning, no matter which side of which issue they found themselves on' 
                                                        
10
 The book was published before Donald Trump was elected to the presidency, which generated some 
ongoing debates amongst historians on whether or not twentieth-century fascism and authoritarianism is yet 
to be repeated. See for example Gordon, 2017; Caplan, 2017; Snyder, 2017. 
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(p. 11). This is, then, another notion of a 'political Freud', one that often – although certainly 
not always – emerged against the will of its main actors, namely psychoanalysts and 
theorists themselves.  
The first part of the book deals with the de-sexualisation of American 
psychoanalysis. This process began with 1930s neo-Freudianism, which ironically paved 
the way for making ego-psychology a 'normative and normalising enterprise' (p. 36), 
although these two schools were very different in most respects. The common depiction of 
postwar conservative normativity, especially with regard to sexuality, makes much more 
sense now when we take into account attempts made by figures like William and Karl 
Menninger to popularize psychoanalysis by compromising on its emphases on the 
importance of sexuality, and by gaining new support from the Protestant and Catholic 
churches in America and millions of believers. Herzog challenges the description of 
American psychoanalysis as a Jewish science by showing that its popularization was not 
only achieved by Jewish émigrés but also by local figures who knew how to use 
psychoanalysis to address some general concerns of those beyond the big urban centres 
(the Menningers, for instance, worked from Topeka, Kansas). Thus, the book convincingly 
locates the shaping of postwar American psychoanalysis within a wider cultural history of 
religion and sexuality, which has been hitherto absent from the historiography. 
The history of sexuality appears to have been even further overlooked by recent 
scholars of psychoanalysis when we read the second chapter about the dark history of – as 
well as the brave struggle against – homophobia within mainstream psychoanalysis. 
Rejecting Alfred Kinsey's reports on human sexual behaviour, published first in 1948 and 
1953, psychoanalysts were not only the main advocates of heteronormativity, but also 
stood up against any sort of psychological legitimation for homosexuality. It was only the 
acceptance of the behaviourist theory of William Masters and Virginia Johnson, as well as 
the 1970s institutional crisis of American psychoanalysis, that forced psychoanalysts to 
reconsider their approach to gay patients. The removal of homosexuality from the DSM in 
1973 did not leave the psychoanalytic mainstream much room to maintain old homophobic 
theories, although many of them still did so privately a long time after.  
But even that was only the beginning of a different, bitter theoretical and political 
debate around allowing homosexuals to work as psychoanalysts, which was fiercely 
resisted by the psychoanalytic establishment.  A change came only in the early 1990s, after 
a long struggle led by a few then-radical new voices such as Robert Stoller, Nancy 
Chodorow, and Kenneth Lewes. Coming from within psychoanalytic circles, these thinkers 
started to demand some major revisions to the way that psychoanalysts theorised sexuality 
in general and homosexuality in particular.  For example, by very often mocking the 
normativity of heterosexuals, Stoller showed the similarities between gays and straight 
people, arguing that sexuality is far from being all about drives; others like Lewes defended 
the legitimacy of gays to find their own place in any theory of the drives without being 
pathologized. As Herzog put it, 'there was and is, apparently, absolutely no necessary 
correlation between a particular psychoanalytic concept (in this case: drives) and the 
politics that could, and can, be made of it' (86). 
But the most important sections of the book are the second and third sections, 
entitled ‘Nazism legacy’, and ‘radical Freud’, where Herzog turns back to Europe to examine 
the ways in which European societies came to terms with psychoanalysis after the Second 
World War and the Holocaust. Chapter 3 reveals yet another dark story from the post-Nazi 
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period, where German psychiatrists used Freudian ideas to deny German pensions to 
Holocaust survivors. Survivors who claimed pensions from the German government had to 
prove that their ability to support themselves had been damaged by at least 25 percent by 
Nazi persecution. But German psychiatrists used Freudian discourse to refuse to 
acknowledge the traumatic life stories of victims, and accused other psychiatrists who did 
acknowledge them of being naïve. As Israeli psychoanalyst, Hillel Klein put it in 1983, after 
these trends had already begun to change:  
 
I am ashamed to read the evaluations by my psychiatric colleagues in Germany. They use 
psychoanalysis to conclude in one case: ‘This child was only two years old; how could he 
experience persecution!,’ while in another case maintaining, ‘The boy was already thirteen years 
old and had lived with his parents, so he had experienced the so- called warmth of the family 
nest.’ (102)  
These medical opinions fitted perfectly well with the anti-Semitic public discourse of the 
post-war era: 'Once again, the ‘Chosen People’ are, each and every one, dancing around the 
‘golden calf.’' (97), wrote one letter-writer to Der Spiegel in 1958. The perception that the 
German reparations were part of wider conspiracy of 'world Jewry' was a major element in 
the wider atmosphere that helped psychiatrists to deny victims’ suffering. 
Although there were some 'sympathizers' with victims among these German 
psychiatrists, it was only in the 1960s and 1970s, when American psychoanalysts such as 
William Niederland and Kurt R. Eissler began to challenge German psychiatry on this issue, 
that public and medical opinions shifted towards giving victims the medical 
acknowledgement they demanded. However, it is not by chance that the 'Americanization' 
of the debate took place at the same time as American soldiers started to return from 
Vietnam, and had to face their own struggle with the government for their traumatic 
experience to be acknowledged by the psychiatric establishment. Indeed, Herzog shows 
how the highly influential discourse of trauma that emerged in the 1980s – including the 
creation of the concept of PTSD in 1980 – was the outcome of a direct and indirect 
'coalition' between Holocaust survivors in both sides of the Atlantic, post-traumatic 
Vietnam veterans, and psychiatrists of both groups. 
Still in Germany, the following chapter tells the story of the rehabilitation of 
psychoanalysis in West Germany from the 1950s to the 1990s. It was mainly the concept of 
'aggression' (and in that context also the 'death drive') that psychoanalysts and other 
commentators felt urgently needed explanation. The work of Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich obviously stands at the centre of this story, but Herzog explores several other, 
lesser-known debates that influenced and shaped the Mitscherlichs' understanding of the 
psycho-social condition of Germany after the War.11  These debates focused largely on the 
'right' reading of the 'real' Freud, and included commentators as different as the ego-
psychology-influenced zoologist, ethologist, and ornithologist, Konrad Lorenz (who was 
criticized for his specific understanding of 'aggression' as an inevitable part of human 
nature, and therefore for somehow exonerating Germany from the crimes of Nazism) – and 
the Freudian-Marxist philosopher and icon of the New Left, Herbert Marcuse. These highly 
                                                        
11
  On the Mitscherlichs see also ffytche 2017. 
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politicised versions of a 'political Freud' also set the terms for the emergence in the 1980s 
of a German 'object-relations' movement with – again – politicised readings of Klein and 
Kohut. 
The last section of the book focuses on the radicalization of Freud on the Left, 
achieved, ironically, by some of his main critics, for example the psychoanalyst Felix 
Guattari and the philosopher Gilles Deleuze in France, on whom the fifth chapter focuses. It 
is mainly the figure of Guattari, who was considered for many decades – together with 
other post-structuralists such as his colleague Deleuze, and of course Michel Foucault – to 
be one of the major critics of Freud, that Herzog wishes to rehabilitate. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s most famous book, Anti-Oedipus (1972), became almost a cult-classic for a whole 
generation of post-1968 radical leftists, and is still regarded as an anti-Freudian 
philosophical manifesto. However, Herzog argues that 'Anti-Oedipus needs to be 
understood also as a psychoanalytic text, not just an attack on psychoanalysis' (156). 
Indeed, while this book stages an intervention in the Freudian legacy, it also intervenes in 
the work of other psychoanalytic thinkers such as Lacan, Klein, Reich, and Fanon. It is a 
philosophical work but also a political call 'against all forms of fascism', to use Foucault's 
words in his preface to the English translation of the book. As such it contains a radical 
critique of the Oedipal model of 'daddy-mommy-me', which Deleuze and Guattari saw as 
too hermetic and misleading an explanation of the social field. As they put it: 'Families are 
filled with gaps and transected by breaks that are not familial: the Commune, the Dreyfus 
Affair, religion and atheism, the Spanish Civil War, the rise of fascism, Stalinism, the 
Vietnam war, May ’68 – all these things form complexes of the unconscious, more effective 
than everlasting Oedipus' (168-9). They suggested a different reading of the unconscious in 
the social sphere, but by doing so they presented yet another 'political Freud'. Herzog 
writes: 
 
[Anti-Oedipus] was as much a work of psychoanalysis as Viennese émigré to New York Ernst 
Kris’s conceptualization of danger as an “invigorant” (whether emanating from antisemitic thugs 
on the street or the encounter with the German Luftwaffe during the evacuation from Dunkirk), 
or Berlin émigré to Los Angeles Ernst Simmel’s theorizations of antisemitism (1946), or British 
analyst Donald Winnicott’s essay on the Berlin Wall (1969), or German analysts Alexander and 
Margarete Mitscherlich’s The Inability to Mourn (1975 [1967]), or Cyprus- born Turkish Muslim 
American Vamik Volkan’s dozens of writings on interethnic conflict worldwide from the 1970s to 
the present, or the Czech- born New York analyst Martin Bergmann’s Generations of the 
Holocaust (1982) or his “Psychoanalytical Reflections on September, 2001” (2004).Or, for that 
matter, as Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (1930). 
In the last chapter of the text, Herzog offers a detailed historical account of postwar 
continental ‘ethnopsychoanalysis’ to the English reader for the first time, and in particular 
the work of the Swiss-based psychoanalysts and anthropologists Paul Parin, Goldy-Parin-
Matthey, and Fritz Morgenthaler. The question of whether psychoanalysis can be applied in 
non-Western societies goes back to the debate of Bronislaw Malinowski with the Freudian 
community on whether or not Oedipus is a valid category in so-called ‘primitive’ 
matriarchal societies. While Malinowski was a great admirer of Freud (contrary to the 
common perception that he was not) he still rejected the idea that the Oedipal model is 
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universal. Less skeptical was the Hungarian psychoanalyst and anthropologist Geza 
Roheim, who attempted to show the universality of the Oedipal structure precisely in 
societies in Central Australia, such as the one in which Malinowski had claimed the Oedipus 
complex did not exist.  The Parins and Morgenthaler followed Roheim’s approach to the 
universal core of the Oedipal conflict, but took it in a very different direction by being the 
first ethnographers to conduct psychoanalytic treatment as part of their work in Mali with 
‘informants-analysands’: 
 
They had approached potential informants with a simple overture: “We would like to get to 
know [the Dogon] and understand how they think and feel.” The chief in the village they chose 
as their home base (Sanga), a man named Ogobara, had volunteered himself spontaneously as 
the first analysand; soon the news got around that these were “tourists of a special kind” – they 
did not want to observe any traditional rites like mask dances, but rather wanted to get to know 
the locals “with their ears.” (195)  
For the locals, this was also a new anthropological practice – ethnographers who wished to 
know the people ‘by their ears’. But as was true of earlier cases of ethnopsychoanalysis, this 
experience mainly facilitated the researchers’ critique of their own Western society, as well 
as of their own clinical profession. Analysing informants was a mutual and inter-subjective 
experience, where the analyst and the analysand are much more equal (indeed, when it 
came to questions of money, these analysands were paid as informants). This experience 
helped the Parins and Morgenthaler promote, on their return to Europe, more reciprocal 
and less hierarchical approaches in the analytical relationships.  But they also used this 
experience for a political critique of European colonialism, capitalism, and the Western 
tendency to pathologize sexuality.12 By the 1970s and 1980s they became well-known 
figures in European New Left circles, and psychoanalysis was part and parcel of their 
political project. As Paul Parin put it in 1989: ‘Psychoanalysis is not possible without an 
attack on the status quo; the critique of society is intrinsic to it’ (213). This was the belief of 
an entire generation of radical Freudians. 
Herzog’s narrative is different from most recent historiography for several reasons. 
First, she starts her story in America and goes back to Europe rather than the better-known 
story of the exodus of Jewish psychoanalysts from the continent to America in the interwar 
years. It is also different from most current historical narratives as, in her story, 
psychoanalysis does not begin its process of slow death in the 1970s when its institutional 
influence was in decline in American psychiatry; rather, she shows how this was a period of 
different clinical and political forms of psychoanalytic influence all over the world 
                                                        
12
  As Dogon village chief said: ‘The whites think too much, and then they do a lot of things; and the more they 
do, the more they think. And then they earn a lot of money, and when they have a lot of money, they are 
worried that the money might get lost. Then they think even more and make more money and they never 
have enough money. Then they’re not settled any longer. That’s why they’re not happy’ (Herzog, 196) 
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(including the US), and especially in Europe where the discipline was born.13 Finally, 
Herzog provides us with a much-needed detailed history of the Freudian Left – this way of 
thinking mistakenly perceived by many scholars to have remained undeveloped since the 
Frankfurt School on the one hand, and not to have survived the post-structuralist critique 
on the other.  
But many of the forgotten heroes and heroines of Herzog were not only Freudian 
leftists, or even ‘political Freudians’, but simply very brave observers, who used 
psychoanalysis to look at things other people wished to forget. As Israeli-German 
psychoanalyst Sammy Speir wrote in 1987: ‘gradually it became clear to me, that behind 
my fear, and the fear of colleagues and patients, of asking questions of the psychoanalyst, of 
psychoanalysis, was not the fear of opening the door to the parents’ bedroom, and being 
confronted by the ‘primal scene,’ but rather, more likely, the fear of opening the door to the 
gas chambers’ (216).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1981, Jacques Derrida gave his lecture on ' Geopsychoanalysis: "… and the rest of 
the world"', in which he fiercely criticized the International Psychoanalytic Association 
(IPA) for its refusal to condemn political violence and torture in Argentina in the late 
1970s.14 I would like to conclude with a lengthy quotation from this text in which Derrida 
describes the very complex relationship – if one can use such a word in this context – 
between psychoanalysis and violence: 
I am not thinking only of the most spectacular ways in which psychoanalytical authorities compromise with 
political or police authorities, nor, inversely, of the most terrifying forms of persecution of psychoanalysts 
and their patients; all such instances follow well known and readily identifiable patterns in the face of 
which positions may be taken up that are perfectly clear and equally valid for any professional, and in a 
general way for any citizen. For there are also more invisible abuses, ones more difficult to detect—
whether in Europe or beyond its borders—and perhaps in some sense newer. Psychoanalysis may serve as a 
conduit for these new forms of violence; alternatively, it may constitute an irreplaceable means for 
deciphering them, and hence a prerequisite of their denunciation in specific terms—a necessary 
precondition, then, of a struggle and a transformation (ibid: 211).  
 
Derrida draws a crossroads for the two different ways in which psychoanalysis can operate 
– for and against political violence. These two alternative operations can be found all over 
the history of the 'political Freud', which has been re-written in the last few years.  
 
                                                        
13
  Herzog writes: 'On the contrary, what was really going on was that the geographical and generational loci 
of creativity and influence were shifting'. The end of institutional dominance of psychoanalysis in American 
psychiatry was the beginning of a 'second "golden age", this one within Western and Central Europe, and […] 
also in Latin America' (7).  
 
14
  They did eventually publish a very general statement without referring specifically to Argentina, as they asked 
to do: “The International Psycho-Analytical Association wishes to express its opposition to the use of psychiatric or 
psychotherapeutic methods to deprive individuals of their legitimate freedom; to an individual's receiving 
psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment based on political considerations; to the interference with professional 
confidentiality for political purposes. The IPA also condemns the violation of human rights of citizens in general, of 
scientists and of our colleagues in particular.” (Derrida, 1991:209) 
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However, Derrida defined himself as a 'friend of psychoanalysis' (Derrida and Roudinesco, 
2004), and therefore refused to remain silent – not only in the face of such violence but also 
the failure of persons and institutions from within psychoanalytic circles to speak up. This 
was an attempt to save psychoanalysis from itself and, as such, an act of friendship. We 
should not forget, however, that since the 1970s, psychoanalysis and other related psycho-
dynamic methods are under constant attack, not only by critics from the 'psy-profession' 
but also by the neo-liberal post-welfare state, one of the major goals of which is to replace 
all forms of psychodynamic psychotherapy with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and 
pharmaceutical solutions.  Derrida argues that human beings cannot be non-political and so 
psychoanalysis must not be non-political. But it is precisely this political potential – indeed, 
the potential to become a 'political Freud' – that made and still makes psychoanalysis a 
target for neo-liberal policy makers, economists, ideologues and the industries behind 
them. 'Political Freud' has always been and still is a frightening vision for many people and 
worldviews. Yet it is also a source of hope to many others who understand psychoanalysis, 
as Derrida did, as almost 'a necessary precondition…, of a struggle and a transformation' 
(Derrida, 1999:211) . The debate surrounding the 'political Freud' still goes on.  
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